Initial Deployment
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed
the 38th Parallel, thus starting the Korean War. President Harry
Truman quickly committed American support to South Korea and the United
States bungled it's way into the conflict. "It is the wrong
war, in the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong enemy,"
declared General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
At the close of World War II, the
United States had thrown away its vast military power and military
appropriations had been reduced to almost nothing. The Berlin Crises
of 1948 demonstrated the stupidity of the unilateral disarmament and B-29s
were hastily brought back into service. However the new Strategic
Air Command had but a small fraction of the forces that the US strategic
air forces had at the end of the war.
In spite of these limitations, SAC was
quick to respond. The 31st Reconnaissance Squadron, 5th
Reconnaissance Group, was then temporarily deployed at Kadena AB, Okinawa.
It quickly moved to Yokota AB to shorten mission time. The 19th
Bomb Group was then stationed at North Field, Guam, but quickly
deployed to a forward base.
The 31st Recon Squadron immediately began flying
combat reconnaissance missions. Results were passed on to the
19th, which sprung into action. On the night of June 28th - only
three days after the outbreak of the war - their B-29s struck enemy
bridges, trucks, tanks and supply columns. This was the first use of
SAC's combat power. During the next month, the 31st Squadron flew
31 missions.
On July 3, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USAF
Chief of Staff ordered the 2nd and 92nd Bombardment Wings to deploy to the
Far East. On the 5th, the 19th
Bombardment Group relocated northward to Kadena, Okinawa to reduce the
distance to their targets. Three days later, the 92nd
Bombardment Group deployed from Spokane AFB (later Fairchild) to
Yokota AB, Japan. The 22nd Bombardment
Group departed March AFB, California on July 13 to join the 19th at
Kadena AB, Okinawa.
Fifty B-29s from the 19th, 22nd and 92nd
Bombardment Groups struck the port of Wonsan, North Korea on July 13,
1950. They dropped over 500 tons of high explosive in the Wonsan Oil
Refinery, dock areas and marshaling yards. It was the first major
strike of the conflict.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was Supreme
Commander of the Allied Forces. As commander of the Japan Occupation
forces, it was intimate aware of the devastation done by American B-29s
during World War II, when Japanese cites were fire-bombed by over 500
fortresses at a time. He had only a tenth as many and wanted
more. He readily accepted an offer from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for two additional bombardment groups.
The 98th Bombardment Group, stationed at Spokane
AFB, was scheduled to make a permanent change of station (PCS) to Ramey
AFB, Puerto Rico. The 307th Bombardment Group was stationed at
MacDill AFB, Florida. On August 1, both were deployed to Kadena.
This was an incredibly rapid response,
especially when compared to the American response to the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor, a decade earlier.
Far East Air Forces (FEAF)
SAC now had five B-29s equipped bombardment
groups and one reconnaissance squadron stationed in the Far East.
They were assigned to the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), which was
established on July 8, 1950. It was assigned the 5th, 13th and 20th
Air Forces, and the Far East Air Material Command. It was
commanded by General George E. Stratemeyer, but Major General Emmett
"Rosie" O'Donnell Jr. was chief of FEAF Bomber Command.
FEAF was distinct from SAC and under the direct control of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. SAC continued to control all the bomber forces in
the ZI (Zone of Interior - i.e., the United States)
Between July 30 and August 5, the Superfortress
virtually eliminated the huge Koman (Hungham) chemical-industrial complex
with more than 1,200 tons of bombs dropped during three missions.
Other targets included the port and dock areas of Chongjin (Sheishim);
Cinnempo industrial area; Haeji ammunition storage area; Songjin magnesium
plant, Suchow hydro-electric plant, Pyongyang arsenal and marshalling
yard; and Seoul marshalling yards, and locomotive and rail car
manufacturing plant. FEAT Bomber Command lost four B29s during the
campaign.
Close Air Support of Ground Troops
The B-29 was conceived and designed as a
strategic bomber. It's mission was to destroy an enemy's ability and
will to wage war. It's primary targets were industrial and
transportation centers. This concept was first advanced by General
Billy Mitchell during the 1920's, but was rejected by army brass, who saw
the airplane as a tactical weapon, one that should be used to support
ground troops. The difference in the two concept was once compared
to a cow and a bucket of milk. Tactical bombing is intended to kick
over the bucket. Strategic bombing is out to kill the cow.
General MacArthur was from the old school and saw
the B-29 as airborne artillery. This resulted in ninety eight B-29s
dropping 859 tons of bombs in a saturation raid on a 3 x 7 mile
rectangular area, north of Weagan, North Korea on August 16. An
estimated 40,000 enemy troops were in the area. This was SAC's first
massive close air support mission. One it would often repeat
in Vietnam.
Strategic Bombing
FEAF had identified and designated eighteen strategic targets
in North Korea. By September 15, all had been neutralized. A
total of 30,000 tons of bombs were dropped in about 4,000 stories against
both strategic and tactical targets. FEAF's B-29s had systematic
destroyed almost every important industrial target in North Korea with the
first few weeks of operations. By late 1950, the B-29s were out of
targets.
On November 4, the 98th Bombardment Group's B-29s
were unable to strike their primary target at Kanggye due to cloud
cover. They went on to Chongjin, which was their secondary target
and dropped their incendiary bombs. It was the first use of such
bombs in Korea by FEAT. The bad weather continued. The next
day the 19th Bombardment Group was unable to attack it's primary targets
at Sakchu and Pukchin, but went on Kanggye, it's secondary target.
It dropped 170 tons of incendiaries, destroying 65% of the target which
was a large ammunition storage and communication center.
Bombing Restrictions
President Harry S. Truman feared drawing the
Chinese into the conflict and the Joint Chief of Staff prohibited the
B-29s from flying across the Yalu River. On November 6, the
President and the JCS forbidding bombing within five miles of the Korean /
Manchurian border. As the B-29s flew increasingly close to the Yalu,
they encountered antiaircraft opposition and began spotting
Mig-15s. The Chinese began testing their weapons and training,
which had been provided by the Soviets. The restrictions were
lifted.
Bridge Bombing
General MacArthur wanted to stop the flow of men
and supplies into Korea from Manchuria. On November 8, FEAF
dispatched a daylight raid of 79 B29s to hit the Sinuiju supply and
communication center. Sinuiju was on the far western edge of Korea,
just across the Yalu River from Antung, Manchuria. It was
anticipated that the city would be well defended by flak
batteries. Fifth Air Force F-51 Mustangs attacked antiaircraft
positions with rockets, napalm and machine guns, while F-80 Shooting Stars
provided fighter cover. Russian MiG-15s took off from Antung to the
engage the fighters. This resulted in the first air battle between
jet aircraft. The MiG was a superior aircraft, but the Chinese
pilots lacked training and experience. A F-80 pilot fired along
burst from his six 50 caliber machines guns, resulting in the first MiG
shot down in Korea.
Just before noon, seventy of the B-29s unleashed
over 584 tons of 500-lb incendiary bombs, while the other nine bombers
from (from the19th Bomb Group) dropped 1,000-lb bombs on the abutments and
bridge approaches. The fighters had effectively suppressed the flak
batteries on the southern side of the target, but the ones on the
Manchurian side opened up with a heavy barrage as the bombers
approached. The B-29s came in above 18,000 feet and flew in tight
squadron formation to minimize time over target. Pre and post strike
photography revealed that the incendiaries had burned about 60% of the
two-square mile built up area in Sinuiju. The bridge approaches were
damaged, but the spans were still standing.
Three navy aircraft carriers launched planes
against the bridges over a course of three days beginning November
9th. They were able to take out the highway bridge and two lesser
bridge up river at Hyesanjin, but the heavily-constructed railroad
bridge survived all their attacks. The aircraft carriers withdrew
and the b-29s were sent in once again.
On November 14, the 98th Bombardment Group sent in nine
of it's B-29s to drop 1,000 bombs on the bridge. The next day, a
combined force of 21 B-29s from the 19th and 30th struck the bridge
again. The bombers fought off attacking MiGs and dropped their bombs
on target. Heavy flak and a 95 mph cross wind made the bombing
difficult and little damage was done. A pair of B-29 sustained battle
damage. General MacArthur called off the attack, maintaining that
the Sinuiju bridge was too strongly defended to risk further aircraft and
air crews.
B-29s from the19th, 98th, and 30th Bombardment
Groups attacked other bridges on November 24, but failed to achieve
satisfactory results. The next day, eight B-29s from the 19th Bomb
Group dropped one span of the Manpojin Railway Bridge. On the
following day, eight bombers from the 30th Bombardment Group destroyed two
spans of the Chongsongjin highway Bridge.
Subsequent command attacks by Air Force and Navy Aircraft had cut
almost half of the international bridges between Manchuria and Korea
during the month of November to no effect. The ingenious North
Koreans and Chinese soon laid pontoon bridges in their place. Winter
brought freezing weather and soon the Yalu was covered with ice hard
enough to support vehicles. Japanese railway engineers told
FEAT intelligence officers that the ice was thick enough to support heavy
weights and that they had one laid a rail line across such ice.
A TDY RB-29 from the 92nd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron was
shot down while on an operational mission near the Yalu River on November
9, 1950. It was the units first combat loss of the war.
The beginning of Smart Bombs
It is very difficult to get a bomb on target.
When it leaves the aircraft, it has more forward than downward motion; it
then begins to drop. This results in a trajectory arc. As it
falls, it is subjected to cross winds, which can vary at different
altitudes. The further it has to fall, the more difficult it becomes
to hit a target. The B-29s were built to attack large targets from
high altitude, not small tactical targets.
The Korean bridges were narrow and very difficult
to hit. The B-29s dropped their bombing altitude to 10,000 feet in
hopes of achieving higher bombing accuracy. This made them easier
targets for intense anti-aircraft fire. They dropped an average of
four bombs per bomb run and made several runs over the target. FEAF
determined that it took over thirteen bomb runs to destroy an average
bridge. The MiG-15 Fagot soon arrived and drove the B-29s to
altitudes of 21,000 feet. With the technology then available, it was
next to impossible to hit a target only twenty or twenty-five wide from
four miles high. Plus, the MiGs prevented the bombers from making
more than one pass over the target. In an effort to improve bombing
results, they began dropping 2,00 lb bombs.
During the fall of 1950, the 19th Bombardment Groups began
experimenting with the 1,000-lb RAZON (Range and AZimuth ONly
bombs.) They had movable fins which responded to radio commands from
the bombardier. This was the first nattempt to guide bombs to a
target, rather than have them simply fall. It was a good idea, but
there were many malfunctions. Only 331 out of the first 487 RAZON
bombs responded to the radio commands; a 67% success rate! A
technical team from the Air Proving Ground Command worked closely with the
air and ground crews. the last 150 RAZONs had a 97%
reliability rate and fifteen bridge were destroyed. It required an average
of only four RAZON bomb to destroy an average bridge.
A new TARZON bomb was introduced in December,
1950. It was based on the huge 12,000-lb British Tall Boy,
which permitted control of both azimuth and roll. Ten bombs were
dropped, but only one scored a hit. Crews of the 19th Bombardment
Group continued to train with them and by March 1951 had become quite
skilled in their use. On Mach 29, 1951, three TARZON equipped B-29s
were ordered to bomb the stubborn Sinuiju bridge, the one that had defied
so many earlier attacks. One aircraft returned with mechanical
problems, a second ditched at sea and exploded on impact, but the third
proceeded to target, only to miss. It was later surmised the
explosion on ditching had been caused by the bomb and the TARZON program
was cancelled.
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