| 
                
            | 
      
                
        
          
            
              | 
                
  | 
             
            
                 
                The Lockheed U2 spy plane was an ultra light glider-like plane
                designed by the Lockheed Skunk Works for the U.S. Central 
              Intelligence Agency.  It's mission was to photography soviet 
              military installations.  Originally, it was hoped that the 
              plane could fly so high that the Russians could not even detect 
              it.  As it turned
                out, although the Russians could see the U2 on radar, it flew so high
                that it was out of range of their missiles and aircraft.  
              There was nothing
                they could do about it.   
                      Because the Russians could not
                shoot it down, the U2 flew freely over all of Russia for four
                years taking pictures of all the Russians' high security
                military equipment. Finally, after four years of providing the
                US with the most valuable information during the entire Cold
                War, one was lost to Soviet action.  Surprisingly, it was not
                actually shot down by the Russians. The Russians sent up a plane
                to shoot down the U-2.  It couldn't reach it, so it shot straight
                up.  At the same time the Russians
                were also firing missiles at the U2. None of them could hit
                the U2 but one did hit a Russian plane!  It exploded and the
                shock waves broke off the U2's fragile wings. The Russians
                captured the pilot and plane ending the missions over Russia for
                the U2.   
     The loss of the U-2 resulted in an international 
              conflict.  In the wake of it, the controversial aircraft were 
              assigned to the Air Force.  Today it is used for high altitude
                research.
               | 
             
             
         
                
       |